Friday, September 25, 2009

 

Phelps on Capitalism and Innovation

Nobel laureate Edmund Phelps has an interesting essay, "Economic Justice and the Spirit of Innovation," in the October 2009 First Things.
The issue of morality in economics is neither the fairness of income distribution nor the stability of financial systems. It is how human institutions can be shaped to correspond to human nature—to man’s nature as an innovator.... Prosperity and the development of the human spirit are linked in the dynamism of the economy. The dynamism of the American economy over the past two hundred years was strong, and that helps to explain why prosperity was high both in the sense of high employment and the sense of a high degree of personal satisfaction compared to that in other countries.... That is the positive moral content of economics—to realize an anthropology that starts with innovative human nature: homo innovaticus, not homo economicus. Existing economics has a negative moral content in that it treats economic factors as though they were pieces on a game board rather than human beings who learn, discover, and innovate. Politicians play the same game, channeling resources from one activity or social group to another without considering the effect on the creativity and judgment exercised within the economy and thus the deep rewards the economy imparts or fails to impart.... Even now, in the midst of an economic downturn, there are signs of vitality that weren’t present in the 1950s. There is exuberance, however irrational, in the banking system, and some originality here and there in hedge funds and private equity, and still some inventiveness in Silicon Valley. Although they may have caused more problems than they were worth, the exotic, new financial instruments showed that America is still the world’s leader in invention. They reflect America’s capacity to create. Unfortunately, the markets were unsophisticated and set mistaken asset prices.

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Wednesday, September 16, 2009

 

Dynamic Pricing for Hockey Tickets

Via Marginal Revolution, a news story tells of daily-changing prices for hockey games:
Similar to airline pricing, the best prices are often found early. Dynamic pricing will provide fans with great prices starting from the initial on-sale on Sept. 12. The upper level single-game ticket prices can go up or down based on a variety of factors, including league standings, opposing team, star players, day of the week, and real time supply and demand. Dynamic pricing for upper level tickets will continue all season. Fans will be able to check out the current prices at any time at DallasStars.com.

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Monday, May 4, 2009

 

The Dollar As an International Currency

I predict that the U.S. will have high and variable inflation in a few years. That makes standard U.S. government a risky investment. We are worried that the Chinese and others will bail out of it. Yet I think we can retain the benefits of being able to sell our debt to foreigners and Americans. We just need to delink the function of store of value from the function of medium of exchange. Here are three ways:

1. Issue more inflation-indexed bonds. We already have some. Foreigners, especially, should want them.

2. Issue bonds denominated in dollars but whose interest payments are in dollars equal to a fixed number of Swiss francs.

3. Issue bonds indexed not to inflation generally, but to a small basket of goods with stable relative prices. I am thinking of Hall's "plywood standard". This avoids the risk of the U.S. government changing the CPI or other ordinary price index.

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Friday, April 10, 2009

 

Filling In Potholes Yourself

From the Chicago Tribune via Taranto at the WSJ:
Do you have gaping potholes on your street and feel the city is not fixing them quickly enough? How about patching them yourself? That's what a group of residents on Chicago's West Side did Wednesday. Members of the South Austin Coalition bought eight bags of a pavement mix for about $100 and used shovels, rakes and a 250-pound push roller to fill 15 holes on the 4800 block of West Van Buren Street....

For starters, it's not safe for people to work in the street without taking safety measures like putting up orange cones to warn traffic, said Brian Steele, a spokesman for the Chicago Department of Transportation. Secondly, city crews are trained in the art of filling potholes—cleaning them out, pouring in the asphalt mix, making it compact and then rolling the patch with mechanical rollers, not the kind you can push.

The driveway mixture the group used in this case may have only cost a little more than $10 for a 50-pound bag, but the city says the $100-per-ton of high performance cold patch it purchases is worth it.

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Monday, March 30, 2009

 

The Amazing Waste from Turning Off Computers Each Night

I saw an article that illustrates why it's good for me to teach students about economic cost as opposed to raw accounting cost:

I leave my laptop running overnight because I know it'll take five minutes or more to get things going in the morning -- not just booting up, but launching the various apps I start the day with, downloading my overnight email, filtering out the spam, and otherwise "getting settled."

But all the power wasted while computers are sitting idle overnight adds up, and one study has finally tried to measure it. The tally: An estimated $2.8 billion wasted on excess energy costs each year in the U.S. alone....

The full report is available for download here (scroll down to "PC Energy Report US 2009")....

If you run a company with 1,000 PCs left on overnight, you can save about $28,000 a year if they are turned off after hours. That's not chump change.

One advantage of the economic way of thinking is that it makes one think of a question here. Why are companies so stupid as to not mandate that their employees turn off computers, if companies could save so much money? The economist naturally wonders if there is something that high-paid corporate executives know that the journalist is missing.

Let's do the full calculation. 1000 PCs * 5 minutes of employee time * 200 days per year * $60/hour or $1/minute = $1 million/year saving from leaving the computer on all night. That compares with $28,000 in energy savings costs.

You can adjust my numbers if you think they're wrong. Suppose its only 1 minute of employee time that it takes them to boot up, 100 days per year that they work, and $6/hour that your company pays them. Then the benefit in labor costs from leaving on the computers is only $100,000 per year, a mere four times the extra cost in electricity.

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Wednesday, March 25, 2009

 

The US Federal Deficit

Heritage, via, Instapundit.

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Thursday, March 19, 2009

 

Hardware Design

Think about USB ports. My Dell, and most computers, have the USB port located in a really stupid place. It's in front now, but in a dark corner under a cover and at a weird angle. The USB interface itself is stupidly designed. It isn't clear which way is up and which is down. The shape should have been made asymmetric to make that obvious.

I think of these are really obvious mistakes, and I could have avoided them with ten minutes thought, max, if I were in charge. But Dell and the USB standards committee must not be composed entirely of morons. Engineers do need a certain minimal intelligence. They even need a very little bit of imagination. Apparently not much. But this shows why it is worth paying such enormous fees to CEO's. Ordinary people simply can't think. It's worth having one person with brains and authority both, who can look at something for five minutes and see something that the engineers couldn't find in a year of looking.

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Thoughts on Macro

Slowly, the recession and crisis are starting to become clearer. Here I'll jot down some thoughts. 1. Why have I thought that Keynesianism had any chance of being correct? I can't think of good theoretical foundations and there isn't good empirical evidence. Sticky wages and prices really isn't enough. There isn't a simple model of the kind that I always require in microeconomics, or a simple story. But since I haven't thought about it hard for 20 years, maybe I should now, since I have learned a lot about modelling and about the economy. 2. I'm coming to think there wouldn't have been much of a recession except for changed expectations around October 2008. Part of the financial sector was in desperate shape, but it looks to me as if all the investment banks and big banks were in desperate shape, plus some speculative banks and companies like GM and GE, but no small banks outside of Nevada and such places. I've come to doubt even TARP I. Was it just that Secy. Paulsen thought that if New York banks fell, so must the world? That's false. 3. Have we been hoodwinked by the Establishment? I suspect the rest of America has just directed billions of dollars to help New York. And not even all of New York. Not Wall Street-- just the banks.

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Wednesday, March 18, 2009

 

It's Hard to Estimate Russian GDP

Marginal Revolution gives some evidence on why I am skeptical that Russian GDP went down after reforms:


Andrew Gelman has a simple question, What is Russia's GDP per capita?  Fortunately this information is easy to find on the web.  As Gelman reports, the answer is:

   1. $7,600 (World Bank 2007)
   2. $9,100 (World Bank 2007)
   3. $14,700 (PPP adjusted, World Bank 2007)
   4. $4,500 (World Bank 2006)
   5. $7600 or $14,400 (gross national income: "Atlas method" or "purchasing power parity," World Bank 2007)
   6. $12,600 (IMF 2008), $9,100 (World Bank 2007), or $12,500 (CIA 2008)
   7. $2,637 in 2000 US dollars (World Bank 2007); that's $3,200 in 2007 dollars
   8. $2,621 (World Bank 2006) or $8,600 (IMF)

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Monday, March 9, 2009

 

Saturday_Night_Live's Geithner Video

The Saturday Night Live Geithner save-the-economy-plan video is very good.

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Wednesday, March 4, 2009

 

The Iceland Bubble

Michael Lewis has a great Vanity Fair article on the Icelandic Banking Bubble. It is good analysis and good sociology and fun to read. I was looking for something in particular, and I think I found it:

You didn’t need to be Icelandic to join the cult of the Icelandic banker. German banks put $21 billion into Icelandic banks. The Netherlands gave them $305 million, and Sweden kicked in $400 million. U.K. investors, lured by the eye-popping 14 percent annual returns, forked over $30 billion—$28 billion from companies and individuals and the rest from pension funds, hospitals, universities, and other public institutions. Oxford University alone lost $50 million.

I suspect this bubble was not a disaster for Iceland at all, any more than the investment banking bubble was a disaster for Wall Street. It looks as if Iceland sucked in, or perhaps I should say suckered in, billions of foreign dollars, spent a lot of it on cars and houses, and gambled away the rest. The result: a lot of rich Icelanders, a few bankrupt banks, and a lot of foreigners who are poorer but probably not wiser.

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Do You Need a College Degree

Someone at the NR blog notes that the military hires people without college degrees and gives them harder, more technical jobs than the private sector gives to college graduates.

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Tuesday, February 24, 2009

 

My Co-Authors

After going to Ian Ayres's excellent 50th Birthday Co-Authors Conference I decided to count up my own co-authors. Stars indicate that what we've written is not yet published (and maybe never will be). I don't include co-editors.

  1. Michael Alexeev
  2. *Maria Arbatskaya
  3. Ian Ayres
  4. F. H. Buckley
  5. *Luis Fernandez
  6. *Barick Chung
  7. *Christopher Connell
  8. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt
  9. *Richmond Harbaugh
  10. David Hirshleifer
  11. Jack Hirshleifer
  12. Maarten Janssen
  13. Thomas P. Lyon
  14. Richard McAdams
  15. * Kaushik Mukhopadhaya
  16. Robert Heidt
  17. Emmanuel Petrakis
  18. Ivan Png
  19. Richard Posner
  20. Manu Raghav
  21. J. Mark Ramseyer
  22. Timothy Perri
  23. Minoru Nakazato
  24. Santanu Roy
  25. Jeffrey Stake
  26. John Wiley
  27. *David Myatt
  28. *Young-Ro Yoon
  29. Todd Zenger
  30. Mark Zupan

Ian is up to 51, I think, with about 30 at the conference and 15 presenting papers there.

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Monday, February 16, 2009

 

The Budget Deficit

The budget deficit:

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Wednesday, February 11, 2009

 

Krugman, Barro, and Crook

Clive Crook wrote an FT column about economists blogging, citing Barro and Krugman as examples of economists who went to extremes. Part was this:

I had thought they would at least agree that raising trade barriers at a time like this must be a bad idea. Then I read Paul Krugman, Nobel laureate, Princeton professor, and New York Times columnist, explain that raising tariffs – though perhaps unwise for other reasons – “can make the world better off”. “There is a short-run case for protectionism,” he went on, “and that case will increase in force if we don’t have an effective economic recovery programme.” What are his readers to make of this? Are all the economists who say otherwise just wrong?

This impression of disarray – that economics has nothing clear to say on these questions – is not the fault of economics as such. It is a mostly false impression created by some of its leading public intellectuals, Mr Krugman among them.

Economics outside the academy has become the continuation of politics by other means. If you wish to know what Mr Krugman thinks on any policy question, do not read his scholarly writings; see which policies are advocated by the progressive wing of the Democratic party. Mr Krugman agrees with liberal Democrats about most things, and for the rest gives as much cover as the discipline of economics can provide – which, given its scientific limitations, is plenty. He does this even on matters where, if his scholarly work is any guide, the economics is firmly against his allies. Liberal Democrats are protectionists. Mr Krugman is not, but politics comes first.

The syndrome affects economists on the right as much as on the left. Just as there is a consensus among economists that protectionism should be opposed, most economists believe that a powerful fiscal stimulus is both possible and desirable in present circumstances, and that the best stimulus would include big increases in public spending. Yet recently, Robert Barro, a scholar with conservative sympathies, wrote in the Wall Street Journal that this view was an appeal to “magic”.

The problem is not that Mr Krugman questions the consensus on trade (if indeed he does), or that Mr Barro questions the consensus on fiscal policy (as he certainly does). It is that both set the consensus aside so carelessly. In doing so, these stars of the profession destroy the credibility of their own discipline. Mr Krugman gives liberals the economics they want. Mr Barro gives conservatives the same service. They narrow or deny the common ground. Why does this matter? Because the views of readers inclined to one side or the other are further polarised; and in the middle, those of no decided allegiance conclude that economics is bunk.

What is interesting is not that article (which is wrong on Barro, I think), but the responses of Professors Krugman and Barro. Mr. Crook displays the correspondence in The Atlantic. Barro and Crook had a polite exchange of emails discussing their disagreements. Krugman said,

Clive used to be a reasonable guy; in his mind he probably still is a reasonable guy. But he has misunderstood what it means to be reasonable. He now apparently believes that it means declaring, in all circumstances, that Democrats and Republicans are equally in the wrong, even if the Democrats are talking Econ 101 and the Republicans are being led by the crazy 36.

And it means hysterical attacks on yours truly for actually taking sides in this debate, with the ostensible basis for the denunciation being a wonkish blog post -- it says so in the title -- in which I acknowledge that there is a potential short-run argument for protectionism, while making it clear that I'm not in favor of acting on that argument. He doesn't actually take on my argument; he just insists that the only reason I might possibly have said anything like this is partisan bias, as opposed to an attempt to be intellectually honest.

That's interesting in itself. But now let us proceed to Paul Krugman's argument for protectionism.

Should we be upset about the buy-American provisions in the stimulus bill? Is there an economic case for such provisions? The answer is yes and yes. And I do think it’s important to be honest about the second yes.

So Krugman not only thinks that there is an economic case for buy-American, but that it's important to stress it. And while we should "be upset" about the buy-American policy, that's just an emotional response-- the "economic case" is in favor of it.

The economic case against protectionism is that it distorts incentives: each country produces goods in which it has a comparative disadvantage, and consumes too little of imported goods. And under normal conditions that’s the end of the story.

But these are not normal conditions. We’re in the midst of a global slump, with governments everywhere having trouble coming up with an effective response.

Okay-- so the economic case against protectionism is not determinative here-- we are in a special situation.
And one part of the problem facing the world is that there are major policy externalities. My fiscal stimulus helps your economy, by increasing your exports — but you don’t share in my addition to government debt. As I explained a while back, this means that the bang per buck on stimulus for any one country is less than it is for the world as a whole. And this in turn means that if macro policy isn’t coordinated internationally — and it isn’t — we’ll tend to end up with too little fiscal stimulus, everywhere. Now ask, how would this change if each country adopted protectionist measures that “contained” the effects of fiscal expansion within its domestic economy? Then everyone would adopt a more expansionary policy — and the world would get closer to full employment than it would have otherwise. Yes, trade would be more distorted, which is a cost; but the distortion caused by a severely underemployed world economy would be reduced. And as the late James Tobin liked to say, it takes a lot of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap. Let’s be clear: this isn’t an argument for beggaring thy neighbor, it’s an argument that protectionism can make the world as a whole better off. It’s a second-best argument — coordinated policy is the first-best answer. But it needs to be taken seriously.
Let me restate his argument. Every country needs fiscal stimulus because of the recession, and that's the most important thing. But countries won't enact fiscal stimulus unless they can be protectionist too, because they're selfish. So, since protectionism isn't as bad as lack of government spending, it's worth having trade barriers so as to get the government spending.

This is, actually, saying that beggar-thy-neighbor policies are a good thing. He is saying that if every country tries to beggar every other by buy-domestic policies, they'll all be better off in the end than if they didn't. He'd prefer having the same amount of government spending without the buy-domestic policies, but he doesn't think that's possible politically.

After a couple more paragraphs saying that we have to consider the political economy, we come to his bottom line:

But there is a short-run case for protectionism — and that case will increase in force if we don’t have an effective economic recovery program.

His argument has three problems (aside from its premise that the stimulus package is a good thing and should pass). First, it's not plausible that the stimulus package will shrink much if it is less protectionist, and his argument depends on there being enough shrinkage to counteract the bad allocative effect of protectionism. Second, if we're talking political economy, we should bring in the fact that allowing protectionism into a stimulus bill will result in it being more distorted to serve special interests rather than having the single objective of serving the public interest of Keynesian stimulus. Third, an economist should start by making the economic arguments clear, rather than mingling them with the politicking, compromise, and buying-off-of-interests arguments. Politics requires compromise, but an op-ed piece does not. In fact, even in politics, you start off the bargaining by taking your preferred position-- you don't start by offering your opponent something halfway towards his position. In fact, you might want to start with something more extreme than your preferred position.

In this particular case, of course, the buy-American provisions weren't in there to garner moderate and conservative support for a bill that wouldn't pass otherwise-- they were an actual hindrance towards compromise. Krugman's got it exactly backwards-- the buy-American was bad economics *and* bad politics.

Note what Greg Mankiw says,

Matthew Yglesias says that my stimulus proposal is "a pretty good idea" but also says "it’s wildly impractical" because it is "so outside the ballpark of what congress is prepared to consider." Let me reply by quoting Milton Friedman:
The role of the economist in discussions of public policy seems to me to be to prescribe what should be done in light of what can be done, politics aside, and not to predict what is "politically feasible" and then to recommend it.

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Saturday, January 31, 2009

 

A Metaphor to Derail the Stimulus?

Where Nations Go to Die is Mark Steyn at his finest. Read the whole thing, but here is the most exquisite part:

The more interviews Speaker Pelosi gives explaining how vital the STD industry is to restarting the U.S. economy, the more I find myself hearing “syphilis” every time she says “stimulus.” In late September, America was showing the first signs of “primary stimulus”—a few billion lesions popping up on the rarely glimpsed naughty bits of the economy: the subprime mortgage racket, the leverage kings. Now, the condition has metastasized in a mere four months into the advanced stages of “tertiary stimulus,” with trillions of hideous, ever more inflamed pustules sprouting in every nook and cranny as the central nervous system of the body politic crumbles into total insanity—until it seems entirely normal for the second-in-line of presidential succession to be on TV gibbering away about how vital the federalization of condom distribution is to economic recovery.

The Nietzschean Democratic Party!

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Friday, January 30, 2009

 

Keynesian Stimulus Grand Links Accumulator

I think a link page for the stimulus would be useful, so here it is. I'll update this as links accumulate. What I'd like to pin down here is economists of at least some name for research--- which for me, practically here, just means that I've heard of them--- who I conclude would prefer no stimulus bill at all to the stimulus bill that Congress has passed. I have not included the many economists who have written ambiguously that stimulus might well be appropriate, or that if we are going to have a stimulus it ought to be tax cuts rather than spending, or that a properly designed stimulus is just what we need, since that is not at all the same as saying that they support a bill similar to what Congress has come up with. Government failure is half the applicable theory here, and a lot of economists seem to go out of their way to avoid talking about the real world stimulus bills.

Please excuse me, anyone, if I've mischaracterized you here. I'd be happy to have a definite statement putting you as PRO, CON, or Undecided. Just email me at erasmuse@Indiana.edu. Also, please excuse my not including you if you are a Cato signer I left off. I'm including only a few people on the lists below whom I've not heard of via academia and scholarship. Thus, for example, Bruce Bartlett and Megan McCardle don't count. And of course Administration officials don't count, so I haven't bothered to look for the views of Christina Romer or Lawrence Summers.

In an earlier posting of this webpage, I remarked on how few pro-stimulus economists I had found. Then I found the January 27 CAPAF letter, which evens things up considerably. It's still true that I haven't found much web or journalism presence of economists saying they support the stimulus. Link suggestions for them are welcomed.


Economists on the Stimulus:

  • For the stimulus:
    1. Menzie Chinn, Wisconsin
    2. A collection of lots of Brad DeLong posts, mostly reacting to other economists (January 2009)
    3. Robert Frank, Cornell
    4. Paul Krugman: January 19, 2009, Getting fiscal, Nobel laureate in international trade.
    5. Jeff Sachs, Columbia University, in the Huffington Post.
    6. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureate in information economics.
    7. Janet Yellen, Berkeley.
    8. Many people signed a January 27 2009 CAPAF letter in favor of the Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Here I list only those I've heard of via academic channels whom I don't list elsewhere on this webpage. There are dozens of others on the list.
      1. Kenneth Arrow, Nobel; Lawrence Klein, Nobel; Eric Maskin, Nobel; Daniel McFadden, Nobel; Paul Samuelson, Nobel MIT; Robert Solow, Nobel MIT; Franklin Fisher, MIT; Laura Tyson; Sandeep Baldiga, Northwestern; William Baumol, Princeton; Peter Berck, Berkeley; Michael Bernstein, Tulane; Rebecca Blank; Guillermo Calvo; Paul Davidson; Hadi Esfahani, Illinois; Marianne Ferber, Illinois; Michael Intriligator, UCLA; Lawrence Katz, Harvard; David I. Levine, Berkeley (not the Wash. U. one who is anti-) ; Richard Murnane, Harvard; John Roemer, Yale; T. Paul Schultz, Yale; Sherrill Shaffer, Wyoming; Mark Thoma, Oregon;
    9. A November 19, 2008 open letter supporting a particular kind of stimulus bill was signed by many economists, including George Akerlof, Paul David, Sanford Jacoby, Gavin Wright, Gary Burtless, Peter Diamond, Laurence Kotlikoff, Julie Nelson, Peter Temin, Ann Markusen, and Susan Helper. It advocated a quick $400 billion bill with 4 specific kinds of spending. Quite possibly those people favor the actual bill that passed, but there are lots of people who would support ideal bills but oppose the actual bill, so I'm not listing them.

  • Against:
    1. Gary Professor Becker (Chicago, Nobel Laureate, labor economics, Jan. 11).
    2. Professor Robert Barro, Harvard. Also this interview.
    3. Willem Buiter, with close attention to who would buy US debt.
    4. John Cochrane (Chicago, Jan. 29)
    5. Tyler Cowen on lack of empirical support(December).
    6. Professor Eugene Fama (Chicago, January 29)
    7. Professor Martin Feldstein (Harvard,January 30). Keynesian, but against.
    8. David Friedman, blog post.
    9. Kevin Hassett (AEI)
    10. Robert Higgs, newspaper op-ed.
    11. David Henderson
    12. Robert A. Lucas (Chicago, Nobel laureate in macro)
    13. Kevin Murphy, Chicago, WSJ with Becker.
    14. Eric Rasmusen, Keynesianism and NewMajority.com.
    15. Russell Roberts, Wash. U. , blog.
    16. A Cato Ad against stimulus was signed by me and lots of people. Here I list only those I've heard of via academic channels whom I don't list elsewhere on this webpage. There are dozens of others on the list.
      1. Mark Bils, Univ. of Rochester;
      2. Bruce Benson, Florida State University; Michele Boldrin, Washington University in St. Louis; Donald Boudreaux, George Mason University; James Buchanan, Nobel laureate; Bryan Caplan, George Mason University; Barry Chiswick, Univ. of Illinois at Chicago; Lloyd Cohen, George Mason University, email; Daniel Feenberg, National Bureau of Economic Research; Kenneth Elzinga, Univ. of Virginia; Paul Evans, Ohio State University; John Garen, Univ. of Kentucky (pdf essay); Michael Gibbs, Univ. of Chicago; Earl Grinols, Baylor University; Ronald Heiner, George Mason University; Jason Johnston, Univ. of Pennsylvania; Boyan Jovanovic, New York University; Jonathan Karpoff, Univ. of Washington; Nicholas Kiefer, Cornell University; Daniel Klein, George Mason University; Deepak Lal, UCLA; David Levine, Washington University in St. Louis; Stan Liebowitz, Univ. of Texas at Dallas; John Lott, Jr., Univ. of Maryland ($8,700 cost per taxpayer); Henry Manne, George Mason University; John Matsusaka, Univ. of Southern California; Tim Muris, George Mason University; David Mustard, Univ. of Georgia; Deirdre McCloskey, Univ. of Illinois, Chicago; Allan Meltzer, Carnegie Mellon University; James Miller III, George Mason University; Michael Munger, Duke University; Kevin Murphy, Univ. of Southern California (not the Chicago one); Richard Muth, Emory University; William Niskanen, Cato; Sam Peltzman, Univ. of Chicago; William Poole, Univ. of Delaware; Edward Prescott, Nobel laureate; Timothy Perri, Appalachian State University; Mario Rizzo, New York University; Richard Roll, Univ. of California, Los Angeles; Charles Rowley, George Mason University; Ronald Schmidt, Univ. of Rochester; Thomas Saving, Texas A&M University; Eric Schansberg, Indiana University Southeast; Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, UCLA; William Shughart II, Univ. of Mississippi (op-ed); James Smith, Western Carolina University; Vernon Smith, Nobel laureate; Richard Wagner, George Mason University; Lawrence White, Univ. of Missouri at St. Louis; Walter Williams, George Mason University;
    17. From the Boehner list: or blog page:
      1. James Kahn, New York University
      2. John Seater NC State Univ.
      3. Alan Stockman Rochester
      4. Jeff Miron, Harvard (CNN comments)
      5. David Laband, Auburn.
    18. The September 2008 letter on the Paulsen bank bailout doesn't count, because it's about a different issue. Whether someone supports spending billions on the banking system is quite different from whether they support spending billions for a fiscal stimulus.

  • I can't figure out whether they're for or against:
    1. Edward Glaeser. Seems to be for some kind of stimulus, but criticizes the kind actually passed.
    2. N. Gregory Mankiw, (New York Times, Jan 10). But see at Prof. DeLong's weblog. I should email him.
    3. Alan Viard, AEI. But see here too.
Note that TARP I, TARP II, and the stimulus bill are three separate policies, and a given economist may have any combination of views on them and be consistent in his economic outlook. I supported TARP I and oppose TARP II and the stimulus bill, for example. The list above is just about the stimulus bill.

  • World War 2: Professor Cowen: Did World War II end the Great Depression?; Professor Paul Krugman,January 23, 2009, Spending in wartime, Professor Cowen on Barro and Krugman and Rasmusen on World War II as a test of Keynesian stimulus and Professor Robert Barro, Harvard (WW 2; and "Lessons from the Great Depression for Economic Recovery in 2009," Christina D. Romer, Brookings Institution presentation, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0309_lessons/0309_lessons_romer.pdf (March 9, 2009).; Thomas Sowell's end-of-New-Deal theory. Other:

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    Wednesday, January 28, 2009

     

    Keynesian Stimulus and World War II

    Professor Barro had a good WSJ op-ed recently on the historical evidence for the USA for fiscal policy. WW2 is the big example-- maybe the only example of where people say it had an effect. He doesn't think much of that as evidence. If WW2 is not a good example, then maybe there aren't *any* good examples of the Keynesian effect.

    Data from the Ec. Rep. of the President is at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2009/B79.xls . The Deficit/GDP ratio rose to 5.9% in 1934 (first year of the data there), to 30.3% in 1943, to 4.2% in 1976, to 6% in 1983, to 4.7% in 1992, to 3.6% in 2004, and was estimated at 2.7% for 2008 (I suppose this estimate is from January 2008).

    A stimulus extra of $400 billion per year would add about 2.9% to the budget deficit for 2009. That would take it up to 2.7+2.9= 5.6% if we use the pre-recession estimate of tax intake and GDP for 2009. We'd reach the 1934 and 1983 levels of budget deficit. Is that enough to take us out of a recession? I'd always heard that the New Deal spending was *not* enough to have much of a Keynesian effect. In that case, the best the stimulus package could hope for would be to mildly helpful-- it's not big enough to get us out of a recession.

    But was the WW2 spending helpful? It was certainly big enough--30% of GDP in 1943. I thought I'd look at the WW2 experience in a very simple way. The first diagram shows the unemployment rate from 1923 to 1940. What would you expect to happen in the 1940s?

    Here's what it looks like to me. The normal unemployment rate is around 4%. If the 1938 recession (was that the "Capital Strike"?) hadn't hit, it would have been reached in 1939. WIthout WW2 it would have been reached in 1944.

    Here's what actually happened:

    It is worth mentioning that there was a massive government jobs program in the 1930's, which affected unemployment. Below I graph both the civilian unemployment rate that I used above and an adjusted, higher, rate which is (Unemployed people + people in emergency govt. jobs)/(labor force). The picture is similar.

    Mark Wieczorek has a graph of the Deficit/GDP ratio 1940-2007: References:

  • Cowen: Did World War II end the Great Depression?
  • Paul Krugman,January 23, 2009, Spending in wartime
  • Cowen on Barro and Krugman
  • Rasmusen on World War II as a test of Keynesian stimulus and Robert Barro.
  • Mark Wieczorek, The National Budget, Debt & Deficit . Graphs and numbers.

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    Wednesday, January 21, 2009

     

    Keynesianism

    I've started reading Professor DeLong's "The Modern Revival of the “Treasury View”,January 18, 2009 draft. He certainly does write well.

    [T]he silliest and stupidest arguments made against Keynes's policy proposals were made by the bureaucrats of H.M. Treasury, with their so-called "Treasury View"1 of Britain's economic problems: that each extra pound sterling of British government spending had to be financed by borrowing an extra pound from Britain's savers, which meant a pound less for Britain's firms to invest. Hence investment plus government spending was constant. So fiscal policy could never boost employment or production no matter what.

    Later:
    [I]t is as obvious a fallacy as you ever find in economics. If no government bureaucrat can boost employment and production even in the shortest run by deciding to borrow and spend more—as the "Treasury View" maintains—than an immediate corollary is that no private entrepreneur can boost employment and production by deciding to borrow and invest more in his firm's capital stock. If the "Treasury View" is correct, then homebuilders' and financial intermediaries' decisions to build more homes were not the cause of high employment in the mid-2000s. If the "Treasury View" is correct, then venture capitalists' decisions to finance internet startups and telecom companies' decisions to invest in fiber optics were not the cause of high employment in the late 1990s. Similarly, the huge unemployment of the 1930s was not due to any unwillingness of businesses to invest produced by the panic of the stock market crash and the waves of bank runs and failures in the early 1930s. And the high employment and output in the 1920s was not driven by private business enthusiasm for investing in the "new era" technologies of radio, electricity, and internal combustion after World War I.
    Later:

    We can immediately recognize that Fama’s argument must be wrong. First, it proves too much: not just that government spending cannot boost employment and output, but also that private enthusiasm like the enthusiasm for housing construction in the mid-2000s or high-tech investment in the late-1990s cannot boost employment and output either.

    Later in the post, Prof. DeLong mentions that if Fama is willing to use a classical full employment model, his conclusion might hold, but that Fama didn't in his original post. Let's try going through the story now, though.

    Case 1a. Suppose that everybody in the economy is working and there is perfect information. When the entrepreneur borrows money from the bank and hires a new worker, he must hire the worker away from an existing firm. Thus, employment does not change. Output does rise, however, because the entrepreneur wouldn't be doing this unless he had a higher-return project than the existing firms and hence can bid away the worker with a higher wage. Or, what happens is that he bids away the capital by offering to pay a higher interest rate to the bank, which calls in its loan from some other firm, which therefore cannot afford to hire the worker any more.

    The example uses labor, but what the entrepreneur hires away might be machines, real estate, or iron ore instead.

    This story is one I use in teaching my students about opportunity cost. For Silicon Valley to grow, Detroit must shrink. It is Schumpeter's idea of Creative Destruction from The Theory of Economic Development. There is a Circular Flow of production in the stable economy, and The Entrepreneur breaks it by diverting resources to an innovation. Brahma can't create without Shiva destroying.

    Case 1b. Now let there be full employment, but imperfect information. The entrepreneur and the public generally think that the new project is better, but it's actually worse. The bank knows this, but also the entrepreneur has enough capital in his firm to repay the loan even if the project goes sour.

    The bank will make the loan. At first, the price of the entrepreneur's company will rise, as will the apparent wealth of the economy. (Will the price of the existing company fall when it loses the worker? I don't know.) Later, the failure of the project will be apparent, and it will be clear that the true wealth of the economy has fallen. The bank, however, will make a profit.

    GDP's course is interesting. Suppose the entrepreneur uses the loan to hire workers to build houses. Those houses have high market prices, and GDP rises that year because it is measured using the price of those houses (or, perhaps, what has previously been the price of houses of that size-- this works either way). Then, it becomes apparent that nobody wants to buy those houses. They have little value. The entrepreneur (or whoever bought the houses at first, if they're not still in his inventory) gets a lot poorer. Notice, though, that GDP does not fall because of this. GDP is a flow value, and doesn't change when the value of stocks change. Also, we don't go back and change GDP figures just because the output turns out to be less valuable than we thought. Nonetheless, we shouldn't think that in that mistaken year the economy was doing wonderfully. It's as if the houses that had been built turned out to be magical castles that turn into mist when someone tries to live there.

    Something like that is what happened in the Telecom Bubble and the Housing Bubble. If the government did the borrowing for a stimulus package instead of the entrepreneur, then it too would have to take the worker from some existing job. Employment wouldn't change. Output would fall, though, because projects in a stimulus package are by definition those that the government doesn't think pass a cost-benefit test in normal times. (I'm distinguishing here between stimulus spending and normal spending.)

    We have to do these first two cases of analysis of the Treasury View to get to the more relevant cases:

    Case 2. Some of the workers the entrepreneur hires come from existing jobs, and some were not employed before. (This is the real Telecom and Housing Bubbles case, I expect.)

    Case 3. None of the workers the entrepreneur hires come from existing jobs. This is the case to understand when we come to analyze the Obama stimulus package. And, of course, we need to figure out if it is a possible case.

    I'll need to return to thinking about Cases 2 and 3 later. I should mention, though, that I have no firm opinion on them. I do oppose the Obama stimulus, but mainly because I think the government would botch it even if it's true that a Keynesian stimulus would be helpful now. I'm a microeconomist, so that's what I pay most attention to. Also, though I'm a fan of Schumpeter, don't think that I am an "Austrian School" economist. I'm not sure what that means, actually, but I associate it with a distaste for equilibrium analysis, mathematical modelling, and price theory. I am a firm believer in all those things, and proud to be part of the MIT-Chicago Synthesis which is standard among modern economists. (I'd put both DeLong and Fama in that category too, despite their disagreements about Keynesian stimulus. Their methodology isn't all that different, just their conclusions. Though maybe I should put Fama in the old Straight-Chicago School; I'm not sure.)

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    Unemployment Insurance

    Why don't we have unemployment loans instead of unemployment insurance? Right now, the government gives money to people who are unemployed, for some period of time. As I recall, the economic reason is that we don't want people to take jobs too soon-- we want them to search. But why not just loan them the money, then? That solves the liquidity problem.

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